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NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by Respondent against Appellants
and others, for a declaratory judgment to determine the
meaning of a motor vehicle dealer's bond provided by
Respondent, as surety, for one Dick Noren, doing business
as Central R.V. Sales, as principal.

The case involves

an interpretation of the contract of the surety in favor
persons protected under the bond, including the Appellants.
The lower court was asked to interpret the contract of the
surety, American Manufacturers Mutual, in light of Subsection
41-3-16(1), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as revised and
amended.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The District Court, with the Honorable Dean E.
Conder presiding, issued a memorandum decision on

December

24, 1981, which was reduced to judgment thereafter, wherein
the court held that the bond issued for one year constituted
a penal sum of $20,000.00 for which the bonding company was
liable as against valid claims for that one year, and that
the subsequent year's premium constituted a second penal sum
of $20,000.00 for which the bonding company was liable as
against claims of valid creditors.

The court thus ruled that

the bonding company was liable for claims of up to $40,000.00;
however, claims have been asserted by creditors of the
principal which exceed $120,000.00.

All cases of all claimants

were ordered consolidated for hearing at a future date to
determine their validity and their right to share in the sums
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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for which the bonding company was found liable, and further
that each party is entitled to share pro-rata in the proceeds.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellants seek a partial reversal of the Declaratory
Judgment to the extent thatthis court find that the clear and
distinct meaning of the contract or suretyship is that the
bonding company is liable for each claim of each valid
claimant in the penal amount

of up to S20,000.00.

These

Appellants do not, however, seek to reverse the court's
ruling that the creditors should share pro-rata in the
proceeds due under the bond, or that the cases should be
heard together "'lt some future time.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or aboutFebruary 5 and 6, 1979 the Appellants
·~ere

induced by an alleged fraudulent artifice to borrow

$18,000.00 each from Tracy Collins Bank and Trust and to

deliver the same to Dick Noren, dba Central

~.v.

Sales.

Dick Noren then gave each a promissory note in which he
promised to secure the funds by separate motor homes valued
in excess of $18,000.00 each, and to repay the notes within
ninety days.
Subsequently, Dick Noren failed to repay the
monies,

then filed for Bankruptcy as No.

Central District of Utah.

80-~0458

in the

The parties/Appellants filed an

action in Third District Court in and for Salt Lake Countv
-'
as action no. C-80-1160, which action was stayed by the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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bankruptcy proceedings.

A separate action was filed in

the bankruptcy court, and the proceedings were eventually
permitted to proceed in the Third District Court.
In the meantime Dick Noren's surety on his motor
vehicle's bond, American Manufacturer's Mutual,

initiated

this action for a declaratory judgment against a number
of claimants who had either filed suit under the bond or
who had made claim under the bond, seeking to place $20,000.00
into court for the benefit of all claimants, and to be
releived from further liability under the bond.
This case comes on appeal to determine the meaning
of the contract of suretyship (the bond), and whether or not
the bonding company should be liable for up to $20,000.00
for each claim, or whether the claim is limited to something
less than that.
American Manufacturers Mutal Insurance Company
wrote a bond, No. 8SE296415,

in favor of the principals,

Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba Central R.V. Sales, on October
31, 1978 as required by U.C.A. 41-3-16,

(1953)

supplement,

and received $400.00 premium therefore.
on October 31, 1979, the bond was renewed by
Dick Noren and Lavonne Norer

1 ,

dba Central R.V. Sales,

for which the Respondent received an additional 5400.00
premium.
The bond is required by Utah statute, U.C.A. 41-3-16
(1953), and a bond is to be given by each motor vehicle
dealership in Utah (of which there are about 1200) regardless
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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of the sales volume of the dealership, or the size of the
dealership.

Since business in the bonding/suretyship field

is competative in this area, and since there are relatively
few companies engaged in the sale of motor vehicle bonds
in the State of Utah, the business is relatively competative.
For the bonding companies it generates approximately $480,000.00
in gross revenues per year from Utah dealerships.
The Utah Motor Vehicle Business Administration
administers the provisions of Section 41-3-16
is required to approve each bond; however,

(1953) and

it does not

prescribe the wording to be used in each bond written.

The

administrator is required only to see that the minimum
requirements of the statute are met before approving a bond
given to comply with the applicable statute.
Numerous claimants have each separately

~ade

clai~s

against the principal, Dick and Lavonne Noren, dba Central
R.V. Sales, and against its surety, American Manufacturers
Mutual,

alleging the principal conducted himself

i~

such a

manner as to give rise to liability on the part of the
Respondent in favor of each of the claimants, of which the
Appellants are but two.

The cumulative amounts claimed by

the claimants exceed $20,000.00, and are believed to be
in excess of $120,000.00.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE BOND PROVIDES IN CLEAR LANGUAGE THAT THE LIABILITY
OF THE SURETY SHOULD BE UP TO $20,000.00 PER CLAIM, AND IS
NOT CUMULATIVE IN NATURE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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The bond of the surety, American Manufacturers Mutual,
was issued in compliance with Section 41-3-16, Utah Code
Annotated (1953)as amended through the 1977 supplement, which
provides as follows:
41-3-16. Dealer's bonds--Necessity, Filing
Arnount--Surety--Form--Conditions--Maximum Liability
Thereof--1.
New Motor Vehicle Dealer's and Used ~otor
Vehicle Dealer's Bond:
Before any new motor vehicle
dealer's license or used motor vehicle dealer's
license shall be issued by the administrator to any
applicant therefor the said applicant shall procure
and file withthe administrator a good and sufficient
bond in the amount of $20,000.00 with corporate
surety thereon, duly licensed to do business within
the State of Utah, approved as to form by the
attorney general of the State of Utah, and conditioned
that said applicant shall conduct his business as a
dealer without fraud or fraudulent representation,
and without the violation of any of the provisions
of this act. The bond may be continuous in form,
and the total aggregate liability on the bond shall
be limited to the payment of $20,000.00.
In connection with and pursuant to this
statute, Dick Noren and Lavonne Noren, his wife,
dba Central R.V. Sales were issued a bond on October
28, 1978, which was renewed October 31, 1979 by
the Respondent.

The bond became effective October

31, 1978, and under the applicable provisions of the
bond, provided as follows:
" ... firmly bound to the people of the State of
Utah to indemnify any and all persons, firms
and corporations for any loss suffered by
reason of violation of the conditions
hereinafter contained in the penal sum of
Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00) lawful
money of the United States ... " (Emphasis
added)
and further on:
" ... and indemnify any and all persons, firms
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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and corporations for any loss suffered by
.
reason of the fraud or fraudulent representations
made or through the violation of any of the
provisions of said Motor Vehicle Business Act,
and shall pay all judgments and costs adjudged
against said principal on account of fraud or
fraudulent representations and for any violation
or violations of said law duriDJ the time of said
license and all lawful renewals thereof ... "
(Emphasis added).
The bond clearly does not limit the aggregate or
cumulative liability of the bonding company to $20,000.00.
From the wording it appears that the bonding company is
liable to any and all persons for any loss in the penal
sum of $20,000.00.

Thus it would appear that the wording

of the bond imposes a $20,000.00 liability limit on a per
person per claim basis.

Any other interpretation of that

wording would unduly construe

the wording beyond their

usual and customary meaning.
The

appe~lants

argue that the statute, Section 41-3-16,

U.C.A. only sets the minimum requirements for
be issued.

t~e

bond to

The administrator is required to protect the

people of the State of Utah by assuring that the bond meets
the minimum requirements set forth in the statute.

His

testimony was that he routinely sends a bond to the attorney
general's office to determine its legal sufficiency, and
the attorney general who approved the wording of the particula:
bond in question,

testified that it is assigned to a

deputy attorney general to determine whether or not it meets
the minimum requirements of statute, not necessarily that
it conforms to the exact wording of the statute.

-6-
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This fact is illustrated by the fact that the wording
of the particular bond was apparently reviewed by one of the
assitant attorney generals in 1947, and had not been changed
by

anyone else in the attorney general's office since that

time even though
in the interim.

the wording of the statute had changed
(T. page 113).

The Utah Supreme Court has clearly adopted the position
that a bond by its terms may be more comprehensive than
required by statute, and that the surety is bound by the
more comprehensive wording of the bond.
Commission of Utah, 128 P. 2nd 751

Zele v. Industrial

(Utah, 1942).

In that case the sole question was whether or not
the bonding company which assumed the role of surety for
an employer's corporate bond which was required as selfinsurer under the then applicable workmen's compensation acts
of the State of Utah,

was liable for compensation due an

employee, Henry Haataja, whose claim had arisen prior to
the effective date of the surety contract, but whose claim
was ongoing in nature.

The contract did not limit as to

time the liability of the surety.

The court held that the

surety company was liable on its bond to Mr. Haataja even
though his claim arose before the bond was executed because
of the inclusive nature of the language used in the bond.
Perhaps it is more correct to state that the court held
the bonding company was liable to Mr. Haataja for compensation
benefits even though his claim arose prior to the execution
date of the bond since the bond failed to mention a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
~
Machine-generated OCR,
may contain errors.

_,_

commencement date.
The court was clearly favoring the claimant by its
liberal interpretation of the bond.

This was so since the

court apparently felt the public interest would better be
served by requiring the bonding company to be liable for
compensation in place of its principal to preserve the
intent of the workmen's compensation act, and give effect
to valid claims of those entitled to recovery under the
act.

Of no little concern in this reqard was that the

bonding company had been paid for its services to act
as surety for the corporate employer.
In the case of Fountain Green Citv v. National Surety
Corporation,

100 Utah 160, 111 P.2nd 155 (Ctah, 1941), the

Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a surety
could be bound to a higher limit than required by statute,
where the bond was unclear as to the desigr.ation of the
amounts due for any given claim.
In that case an ordinance required that the water
superintendent furnish a $750.00 performance bond as marshall
and furnish another $1,000.00 bond as water superintendent.
The surety company, which became his bondsman,

issued a

blanket bond in the total penal sum of $1,750.00 for "faithful
performance of duties as city marshal! and water superintendent
as required by law."

The court held that the surety became

liable for the full penal sum of $1, 7 50.00 regardless of whethe!
the loss was due to the principal's liability as water
superintendent or as marshall.

The surety company argued that

it should be only liable up to the sum of $750.00 if the r1~~m
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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was due to misconduct as marshall or $1,000.00 if the
misconduct was due to his activity as water superintender.t.
The court held that the surety was bound for loss of up to
$1,750.00 if the loss was due from either or both jobs,
thus holding that the language of the bond,

if more

comprehensive than the lanquage of the governing statute,
will control.
The Utah Supreme Court in the Fountain Green City
va. National Surety Corporation case (ibid) adopted with
approval the rule laid down in the Bamberg County v.
Maryland Casualty Company, et al, case, 173
174 S.E. 917,

s.c.

106,

918, which held that "while the statute

required principal to furnish a bond for $2,000.00 only,
it is my judgment that he and his surety could lawfully,
by contract,

increase the amount of the principal's bond by

voluntarily executing a bond in a larger sum and when they
chose to execute a bond for $3,000.00 conditioned upon the
proper discharge of Rowell's duties as auditor and
superintendent of education,

it is my opinion that the county

was secured as to either and both offices in that sum."
The Utah Supreme Court adopted with favor the holding
of Peters v. Beckdolt, 100 Ind. App. 395, 192 N.E. 116
in the Zele case (supra.), which held that where the terms of
a bond included a greater period of liability that the
underlying statute required,

that the longer period of

liability of the bond was binding on the surety.

-9-
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In a neighboring jurisdiction, the Nevada supreme
Court held in Royal Indemnity co. v. Special Service Supoly
Company,

413 P.2nd 500 (Nev., 1966) that a surety was liable

on its bond which was stated more broadly than required by
its governing statute.
bond.

That case dealt with a contractor's

The surety argued that the statute did not extend

to simple breaches of contract on the part of the contractor.
The language of the bond itself was found to be inclusive
enough to encompass simple breaches of contract.
held

The court

alsothe broader language of the bond to be binding on

the surety.
In Robinson Clay Products Co. v. Beacon Construction
Co. of

Massachuse~tes,

159 N.E. 2nd 530 (Mass., 1959), the

court held that the surety would be liable for its bond which
contained no express provision
i~jured

limiti~g

time in which an

party might sue on the bond even though the statute

pursuant to which the bond was issued included time
limitations.

The action on the bond was filed after the

statutory limitation period had run.

The court nevertheless

found that the surety was liable on the bond because of the
absence of language in the bond requiring a filing within a
limited period of time.
In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Housing Authority of
City of Miami,

256 S 2nd 230 (Fla. App., 1972), the court

held that a bond required by statute may be executed more
broadly than required by statute.

The statute underlying

the bond did not required liability for claims based on
breach of contract or negligence.

The terms of the bond

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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included such coverage.

The court ruled that the bond should be construed
against the drafter, the surety in this case, and that
it should be construed more broadly that the terms of the
statute which required the coverage.
In the instant case the underlying statute does
not require that the bond be continuous in form,

it merely

provides that it may be continuous in form, thus suggesting
that the parties may contract otherwise.
The statute provides that the liability under the
bond shall be limited to the payment of $20,000.00, and one
would assume from this wording that this sum is meant to
be a minimum standard for motor vehicle dealers and not
necessarily a maximum figure.

The Supreme Court of Utah

has clearly ruled that parties under a performance bond may
contract for a higher degree of liability than the minimums
set down by statute.

The court undoubtedly is taking into

account the ultimate beneficiaries of such an arrangement,
the people of the State of Utah, for whom the statute was
meant to protect.
It is also interesting to note that the statute does
not say that the payment of $20,000.00 is per claim or
for all claimants.

It does state that the aggregate liability

shall be $20,000.00; however, this could mean that the
aggregate liability per claim is $20,000.00.

Whether this

represents some confusion in the statute itself or not,
the wording of the bond is most certainly clear that it
does not
limit the liability of the bonding company.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Nothing is said in the wording of the bond about
limiting it on "aggregate" liability, or that the total
cumulative liability shall be $20,000.00.

The bond

leaves this open, and does specifically state that it
will indemnify any and all persons for any loss suffered
in the penal sum of $20,000.00.

The only reasonable

definition of these terms is that each claimaDt is
entitled to claim up to $20,000.00 for any loss suffered.

POINT II
THE WORDING OF THE BOND SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AGAINST
THE BONDING COMPANY AND IN FAVOR OF THE APPELLANTS
The Respondent bonding company elected to utilize
f

or~s

of the bond which apparer.tly had been used in the

state for many years.

There is no indication that the

forms were provided to it by the administrator

of the

Utah Motor Vehicle Business Administration, or that the
forms were required to be used by the administrator or
the attorney general's office, who are required to pass
on the sufficiency of each bond issued.
There is evidence in the record that the administrator
had approved riders to this bond form which changed conditions
of the bond,

thus it was not considered above arnendrnent.{'!.pg.i:

In cases such as this,
takes the upper hand.
form of the bond.
party.

it is the bonding company who

They are the ones who select the

They are thus considered the drafting

Neither Mr. Noren nor anyone else had any input

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-12-

concerning the wording of the bond or its sufficiency.
The company had been in Utah for several years and was
familiar with this type of bond, which it considered a
"no risk" bond.

In other words,

the bonding company

does not consider this type of bond to be "risk" monies,
since (a)

it checks out the credit and credability of the

principal,

(b) takes back from the principal a guarantee of

reimbursement in the event of a loss,

(c) can cancell the

bond with 60 days' notice at any time it feels itself at
risk, and (d) conducts annual audits to insure itself
that the business practices of the applicant are in
conformity with accepted business practices required by
statute in the State of Utah.
It is significant to note that the language of
the bond does not track the language of the statute.
The bond could have stated that the surety was bound only
for all loss in a total aggregate liability of $20,000.00
suffered by reason of violation of the conditions
enumerated in the body of the bond. Nevertheless, the
bond failed to track the wording of the statute, and the
bonding company chose to utilize this bond which stated
that the bonding company would be liable to any person,
firm or corporation for any loss in the penal sum of
$20,000.00.
In the Royal Indemnity Company v. Special
service Supply Company case, supra,

the concluding

opinion of the Nevada Supreme Court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"We are reinforced in these views by a
~in~l point.
The bonding requirements
incident to a new contractor's license
are expressly set forth in NRS 624, 270,
supra.
If the instant bond was intended
only to fulfill that statute as Royal
insists, the parties could easilv have
drawn their contract in the exact wording
of the statute." (Emphasis added.)
'

'

I

"This to some extent they did-but they also
spoke of "defaults" and "material bills."
The only reasonable inference is that they
intended to go beyond the statutory
lanquage."
And in the Traveler's Indemnity Company v. Housina
Authority of City of Miami, cited supra.,

the court noted in

extending the liability of the surety beyond the meaning of
the statute underlying the bond:
"Parties in executing a bond may contract
for provision3 broader than the ~i~i~al
requirements of the statute. A surety
company is bound by any terms of its bond
which extend beyond the statutory requirements.
And in a case recently decided in
Court for Salt Lake County, by Judge James

t~e

Third District

s. Sawaya, and which

is now on appeal before this Honorable Court, and with which
this case has now been consolidated for argument, Dennis
Dillin Oldsmobile, GMC,

Inc. vs. Frank T. Zdunich, dba Mountain

View Motors, et al, No. 17886, Judge Sawaya ruled in partial
summary judgment that:
"The Bond of Motor Vehicle Dealer Salesman
provided by defendant, Occidental Fire and
Casualty Company, in this action, and under
41-3-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1?53, and bonds
required by said Section, are for the benefit
of any person, firm, or corporation suffering
loss by reason of the violation by the
principal of any of the provisions of
Chapter 3, of Title 41, Utah Code Ann.,1?53
or by reason of fraud or fraudulent
representations made by said principal.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Lawand
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the surety under such bond is $20,000.00
per claim, and the payment by the surety
of one such claim in the amount of
$20,000.00 does not relieve said surety
of liability on any other such claim."
A surety bond is a contract. The Restatement of Security
states that such a contract is to be interpreted
according to starrlards that govern the interpretation of
contracts generally.

The terms of the contract are to

be understood in their plain and ordinary sense.
rule of

construction~pplies

The basic

that the contract is to be

considered as a whole; all of its provisions are to be
construed together.

Suretyship, 74 Arn. Jur. 2nd, Section

26 at page 28.
If the words in the contract are not vague or
uncertain, the court is constrained from rewriting the
contract to conform with the words of the statute.
Provo, City Corporation--v. Nielson Scott Company, 603
P.2nd 803

(Utah, 1979).

In Skousen v. Smith,

27 Utah 2nd 169, 493 P.2nd

1003 (Utah, 1972). the court stated:
" ... it is equally elementary that parties
may be bound by the language they deliberately
use in their contracts, irrespective of the
fact that it appears to result in improvidence,
beyond and perhaps in excess of what the
mythical reasonable, prudent man might feel
constrained to venture."
The lower court found that the words of the
contract were vague and uncertain.

Even if this court

agrees with the lower court on that point, where there
is ambiguity in a contract, such ambiguity must be
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interpreted against the Respondent, since it prepared
and/or presented the contract to the principal for
signature.

Wilson v. Traveler's Insurance company,

605 P.2nd 1327 (Okla., 1980).

The fact that the

Respondent chose and utilized the form requires that
he live with the ambiguities utilized in the form,
and they must be most strongly interpreted against his
interest.

Since the Respondent's chosen form failed

to use such limiting words at "aggregate" or "total
liability", he should not now be permitted to claim
that the statute now places such limitations upon his
liability.
If the court were to so hold,
the uncomfortable position of

it would be placed in

refor~ing

the

cont~act

to

meet the minimum requirements of the statute, a position
which was certainly not within the mind of either party
at the time the contract was executed.
POINT III
PUBLIC POLICY IS SERVED BY EXTENDING LIABILITY
UNDER THE BOND TO $20,000.00 PER CLAIM
Section 41-3-16, U.C.A.

(1953)

as revised and

amended was obstensibly passed by the Utah State
Legislature to protect the public of the State
from deceptive and fraudulent practices of new and
used car dealers in connection with the sale of
motor vehicles.
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It is the general public that ought to be of
greatest concern when interpreting any statute or
the applicability of any bond provided pursuant to
that statute.
One should take note that if the court were
to construe the bond given as a "continuous" type
bond, that is, a bond when renews itself from year
to year with a $20,000.00 fixed all-inclusive liability,
some incongruous results are obtained.

The individual

pays a $400.00 yearly premium for that privilege.
Assuming that the bond only pays on a "claims made"
basis.

If a claim is made for $20,000.00 in one year,

and another claim of $20,000.00 is made in the following
year,

the bonding company would only be liable for

a total of $20,000.00.
On the other hand,

if the principal had shopped

between two bonding companies, and had obtained a
bond from one company in one year, and a bond from
another company in the following year, and had paid
exactly the same premium both for the initiation of
the bond as

for the renewal, he would then in effect

have coverage to cover both claims,

i.e. $40,000.00

rather than $20,000.00 as under the single company
coverage.
Clearly,
interest,

such a result militates against the public

and the court would wish to protect the

public interest to the greatest extent from the
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fraudulent practices of deceptive new or used motor
vehicle dealers.

It would thus rule that the result

should be the same in the case where the principal
purchases a bond from one surety for two (or more)
years,

as in the case where the principal purchases

a bond from two different sureties for two (or more)
years.
The public interest is also best served in the
instant case to rule that where a contract enlarges
liability of the surety beyond the statutory minimum,
that the surety, who after all is being paid for such
offer of suretyship, should be bound to that larger
scope of liability.

Thus, where there are numerous

claims, all of which jointly exceed the 520,000.00
~inimum

liability imposed by statute, the court is actinq

in the best interest of the general public, who are
to be recipients of the legislature's

i~tended

protection,

by finding that the surety is liable to each individual

claimant up to the maximum $20,000.00 claim.
Nor should the court feel amiss in finding such a
result,

since the statute and the bond itself,

specifical~

gives the surety the right to determine the integrity of
its insured,

and does not govern the amount required to

secure such a bond.
In addition the surety can terminate its agreement,
unilaterally with the principal at any time it feels its
position as surety is threatened.
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Also, the surety is minimizing (and in fact is reducina
to nearly zero) its risk.

As was testified bv the

underwriter's agent at trial (T. page 71), the surety
does not anticipate any loss in writing this type of
bond.

They take back a pledge against the principal

for reimbursement of any losses they might incur as a
result of having written a bond, and further,
a credit application, as in this case,

they take

from the principal,

to determine his net worth, and his ability to pay in the
event of a loss claim.

They also check his reputation

for honesty, and his credit standing in the community.
Under such circumstances, the bonding company does not
anticipate any losses.

And the rates are based upon

loss data; rather, they are based to some degree upon
administrative overhead to cover the cost of setting up
a principal's account.
Also, the court should be concerned with the practical
aspect of holding the surety to an enlarged degree of
liability in the instant case.

Although the legislature

did not require a bond which was based upon the number
of employees, the sales volumn of a dealership, or the
size of the dealership, the court should be cognizant
of the effects of inflation in the automotive industry
in the past several years.

With the cost of new or

used motor vehicles, it would hardly be conceivable to
imagine

that a $20,000.00 bond would not be fullv consumed

by more than a couple of claims.
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As the instant claim so vividly illustrates,

a

half dozen or so claimant's claims comes to more than
six times the amount of the yearly bond of $20,000.00.
It cannot be said that a strict interpretation of the
statute limiting the amount of the surety's total
liability to $20,000.00 is serving the best public
good.
Where two interests are to be served, the surety
Whoprotect's the principal's obligation, and the public
interest,. it is the public whose interest should receive
first consideration.
The court, by upholding a more liberal interpretation
of the meaning of the contract, is
of freedom to contract.

furtheri~g

the concept

Contrary to the concept set

out by the Respondent, such feedom of contract does not
halt the issuance of such bonds by bonding companies.
Bonding companies are free to contract with anxious
dealers.

Perhaps the net result is that bondir.g companies

will be more careful in the selection of principals.
Perhaps they will take a closer look at the credentials
of would-be dealers.

Who could dispute that such attentiot

would inure to the public good.

Since the bonds are not

based upon loss incidence, who is to say that the premiums
would increase significantly, if at all.

The result would

be that companies who write such bonds would be more
selective in the persons they accept to bond.
Of course,

the bonding companies could limit their

liability to statutory minimums, if they soap~;~-~
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No matter which route the bonding company takes,
interests of Section 41-3-16 is preserved.

the

The actions

of dealers who act fraudulently would be compensated
to the injured public, and the preservation of freedom
of contractual relations is protected.
Aff irmance of the principal that the present contract
expands the liability of the surety does not undercut
the policy that bonds may be extended for a minimum
liability of $20,000.00, since under the statute the
dealer and the bonding company may still contract for
such minimum coverage.

But affirmance of the theory

of the Appellants does make a statement that the court
believes that the public interests are best served by
requiring the surety to reimburse each valid claim up
to a maximum of

$20~000.00

per claim.

CONCLUSION
The Appellants respectfully submit to the Supreme Court
that the contract between the surety and its principal
should be read to require the surety to be bound up to
$20,000.00 per claim for each valid claim presented.
Of course, before the surety is bound, each claim will
have to be litigated as to its validity under the contract
of suretyship, and this court is not required to pass
upon the question of the validity of those claims.
The Court is called upon to find that the liability of
the surety is expanded beyond the minimum statutory
requirement of Section 41-3-16, U.C.A.

, 1953 (as revised
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and amended) .

The Court should determine that the

contract between the parties is binding upon them,
and that ordinary interpretation of the words within
the four corners of the contract compels the Court
to find that each claimant is entitled to pursue his
claim up to a maximum of $20,000.00 per claim.
In the event that the court finds that the contract
is ambiguous within its four corners, any ambiguity
should be interpreted against the interests of the
surety,

since they were responsible for presenting such

contract for execution.
Dated this

I~"""" day

of May,

1982.

DAVID K. SMITH, ESQ.
Attorney for Appellants
Dale Christiansen and
John w. Whiteley
8676 South 2635 East
Sandy, Utah 840~2
Telephone:
942-5723
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